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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
Upon the premises encumbered 'by the plaintiff's mortgage to the -bank
was located a building which contained two stores on the first floor and
two suites of living quarters on the second floor, one of which was used
by the plaintiff as his home.
The primary issue was whether this was "a dwelling or dwellings for
not more than two families" and therefore within the purview of the
statute hereinbefore referred to. In the court of common pleas, judgment
was rendered against the bank and the court of appeals rendered substan-
tially the same judgment. Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court
held that the building was not within the scope and purpose of the statute,
and stressed the fact that the whole first floor was designed for use and
was used for business purposes; that only the second floor was used for
dwelling purposes. It was held, therefore, that Revised Code section
2329.08 did not preclude the enforcement of the bank's deficiency judg-
ment.9 In reaching that conclusion, a majority of the court felt that the
statute in issue, being a special restriction of the general right to enforce
contracts in the usual way, should not be so liberally construed as to for-
bid an action not plainly prohibited -by its terms; in other words, that
the statute should not be extended by implication to deny that right.'0
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Zoning - Abandonment of Non-conforming Use
Some zoning ordinances provide that a prior existing non-conforming
use, once abandoned, may not thereafter be renewed.' Such provisions
are usually upheld. The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County refused
in an interesting case in 1956 to allow the City of Garfield Heights to
prohibit the resumption of such a use which had lapsed for a period of
about 15 years. 2
The decision may very well turn upon the specific factual unreason-
ableness of the application of the prohibition of the ordinance to the cir-
cumstances of the case. It is safe to hazard a guess that the court would
have decided the same way, even if no question of cessation of a prior
9 Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a "deficiency judgment" in the sense that
a formal judgment of that description is entered. There is only the original judgment
for the full amount of the indebtedness, upon which a deficiency may exist after the
application of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged premises.
'" Three judges dissented. The reasoning of the majority is in line with an earlier con-
struction of the statute. See Cart v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 148 Ohio St. 533,
76 N.E.2d 389 (1947).
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non-conforming use had been involved, relying upon an unreasonableness
of the ordinance as applied to plaintiff's property.
One of the bases for the court's decision was that the ordinance pro-
vided in part as follows:
A non-conforming use shall be considered abandoned when the in-
tent of the owner to discontinue the use is apparent, or when it has been
replaced by a conforming use, or when the characteristic equipment and
furnishings of the non-conforming use have been removed from the
premises and have not been replaced by similar equipment within two
years. a
The moral of the decision to this writer is this: as the draltsman of
such ordinances, it is advisable to adopt an objective rather than a sub-
jective test of abandonment, if a "tough" ordinance is desired. Many
such provisions make no allowance for the intent of the owner of the
non-conforming use. To the extent that his intent is permitted to be
considered as a factor in abandonment by the owner, it may be more
difficult to eliminate such uses.
The case also contains another statement, probably also dictum, but
of noteworthy significance, which is to the effect that the population
trend in the municipality, and its future needs for land for a given pur-
pose may be admissible in evidence in support of the validity of its zon-
ing ordinance and its allocation of the various land areas to various uses.
The general basis for the court's decision appears to be that the value
of the land, if used for the industrial purpose of removal therefrom of
high grade brick clay deposits, was so much greater than if it were used
only for the residential purposes for which it had been zoned (the dif-
ference amounting to over $300,000.00), that it was an unreasonable
deprivation of the owner's property rights to enforce the provisions of
the ordinance as to the particular parcel 4
Utility Service Charges Enjoined
The problem of pollution of natural water courses and resources has
become an increasingly serious one in recent years, brought about by
growing urbanization of rural areas on the one hand and an increased
awareness of public officials of the great danger to one of our most vital
resources, on the other. The legislature has enacted comprehensive legis-
lation upon the subject.5
1 See 6 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 182, 183, n. 7 (1955)
- Cleveland Builders Supply Co. v. Garfield Heights, 136 N.E.2d 105 (Ohio App.
1956)
3Id. at 108.
'Cf. Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
5 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 6111.01- 6111.99.
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The Council of the City of Gallipolis enacted an ordinance fixing
rates and charges for the use of a sanitary sewerage system and sewage
disposal plant. The city did not at the time of the enactment of the
ordinance, nor at the tune of the institution of suit, have any such system
or plant, had issued no revenue bonds to provide a fund to create such a
system or plant and had made no plans for construction, management or
control thereof. Apparently the council's purpose was to create a fund
for the construction in the future of such a system and plant, by tacking
a charge onto the bills of utility users who would benefit by the improve-
ment when it should be constructed.
The city was enjoined from collecting such charges and from dis-
continuing the supply of water to such inhabitants thereof as refused to
pay the charges.6 The court refused to pass upon the question whether if
the city had taken any affirmative steps towards the construction of such
a system its right to make charges for the future use thereof could be
justified, holding simply that its council could not so provide when it
had done nothing at all towards providing the service.
Public Purpose - Exemption of Property From Taxation
The Ohio Constitution permits the legislature to exempt " public
property used exclusively for any public purpose. " from taxation7 and
the legislature has done so.8  The courts have generally been strict in
their interpretation of the wording of the statute providing for such ex-
emption, on the theory that such exemptions are not to be lightly granted
and that, insofar as is possible, all property ought to bear its fair share of
the cost of government.9
The line between what is and what is not a public purpose is not al-
ways easy to draw 10 and complete consistency does not always exist. Some
difficult problems come up for adjudication, in which one does not envy
the court's duty to interpret the law and the facts and to be fair to all
parties.
The case of Columbus v. County of Delaware" involved such a con-
flict. The City of Columbus, in Franklin County, purchased with the
proceeds of mortgage revenue bonds a plot of land in Delaware County.
It proposed to use that land to hold a reservoir of water, which water
'Knotts v. City of Gallipolis, 100 Ohlo App. 491, 137 N.E.2d 592 (1956).
7 OHio CONsT. art. XII, § 2.
8 OHio REv. CoDE §§ 5709.08, 5709.11.
'51 AM. Jun., Taxation § 495 (1944).
"State ex rel. v. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 26 N.E. 1061 (1891)
11164 Ohio St. 605, 132 N.E.2d 747 (1956)
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would be sold and distributed by Columbus to its residents and the resi-
dents of its suburbs.
Several questions were raised by the case:
1) Whether a reservoir and the real estate thereunder were "works"
within the meaning of the word in section 5709.1112 of the Re-
vised Code.
2) Whether the facts that the municipally owned property was
used in a proprietary rather than a governmental function, and
that revenue was incidentally to be obtained from its operation,
precluded its exemption from taxation.
3) Whether the fact that the property lay outside the limits of the
county in which the owner-municipality was situated precluded
its exemption.
The Supreme Court held that the failure of the legislature specifically
to mention land in section 5709.11 as exempt did not preclude its exemp-
tion as public property under section 5709.08; that a public purpose of a
proprietary nature is a public purpose; 13 and that the fact that the tax-
payers in the adjoining county would in effect be subsidizing the water
users in metropolitan Franklin County did not preclude the exemption.
The last mentioned argument is in this writer's opinion the most tell-
ing one. While he agrees that the result is a correct one under the law,
the problem is an increasingly severe one, and it cannot be solved by
simply falling back on the statutes. With the growth of our metropoli-
tan areas, there will be more such geographical "invasions." The extent
to which the turnpikes take land off the tax duplicate with no correspond-
ing financaal return to the affected municipal corporations or other po-
litical subdivisions is a critical example. The writer suggests that per-
haps an amendment to the exemption laws to provide for some "rental"
payment to the "invaded" subdivision by the operator of a revenue-pro-
duang utility would help to correct the inequities of the situation.
Municipal Contracts - Liquidated Damages Provisions
The Council of the Village of McArthur by ordinance authorized a
municipal improvement in the form of construction of sewers for the
village. The legislation did not specify any time for completion of the
work and did not indicate in any manner that time was of the essence.
' "Works, machinery, pipelines and fixtures belonging to a municipal corporation
and used exclusively for conveying water to it, or for heating and lighting it, shall be
exempt from taxation."
" Here it was necessary to skirt carefully around several recent cases: Cleveland v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 97, 126, 91 N.E.2d 480, 494 (1950) and
Zangerle v. Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720 (1945)
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The Village Board of Public Affairs, however, stipulated in the contract
entered into between it and the contractor for a 150-day completion date,
and for "liquidated damages" in the sum of $25 per day for "each and
every day the time employed on said work may exceed the time stipulated
for its completion."
The contractor contended that since the provision in the contract for
liquidated damages for delay in completion was not included in the
ordinances, it could not be inserted in the contract and was therefore
void. No question appears to have been raised, nor did the court in its
opinion1 4 refer to the statutory authorization for such provisions' 5 and
the requirement that they be stipulated by the legislative authority of the
corporation.
The court held that since "the powers of the legislative authority of a
city (sic) shall be legislative only" and since a council shall not perform
any admimstrative duties, it became the duty of the Board of Public
Affairs "to execute the contract and supervise the work to completion."
The inference is that it was not the business of and apparently -beyond
the power of the council so to provide, and henceforth within the power
of the Board of Public Affairs so to provide.
It is difficult to see how the result could have been reached in view
of the statute referred to in the footnote, and particularly in view of the
requirement that the legislative authority provide the bonus-penalty
clause.
Regulation of Truck Traffic
The problem of reasonableness of municipal regulation, even within
areas left by the legislature and the courts to control by councils, is a
difficult one. A basic requirement is that a municipal ordinance, even
within a permitted field, " must not be arbitrary, discriminatory, ca-
pricious or unreasonable and must bear a real and substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public."' 6
The City of Bellevue lies on U.S. Route 20 and is temporary host to
an exceedingly heavy volume of truck traffic. In an attempt to control
such traffic, it provided by ordinance that trucks using the particular high-
"' Snyder v. Village of McArthur, 99 Ohio App. 324, 133 N.E.2d 399 (1955).
1 OHio REV. CODE § 731.15" " When a bonus is offered for completion of con-
tract prior to a specified date, the legislative authority may exact a prorated penalty
in like sum for each day of delay beyond the specified date. " (Emphasis sup-
plied). The opinion is also silent whether the contract provided for a bonus of $25
per day for early completion. Is this an instance of inadequate legal research by
the lawyers for the contractor?
"Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943). Of course, the
courts are always the final arbiters on whether the test is met.
1957]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
way within the corporate limits "must follow and stay in the extreme
right lane of said street while travelling on said street " and forbade
the passing or overtaking of another motor vehicle by heavy trucks at any
time or place on said street.
The Supreme Court held the ordinance invalid.' 7 It pointed out that
the ordinance made no exception for the presence in the only lane per-
mitted to heavy trucks of a parked or disabled vehicle or an excavation
or obstruction. It refused properly to heed the contention of counsel for
the city that the ordinance would not be invoked under such circum-
stances. In other words, the ordinance violated due process by its very
terms, and not only in its enforcement. The implication is that had it
provided for exceptions in the contingencies suggested it might have been
upheld.' 8
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Hamilton County declared uncon-
stitutional an ordinance of the City of Reading,'9 which forbade traffic
on the streets of that city of all vehicles having a gross weight in excess
of 20,000 pounds, but which exempted from its prohibitions transporta-
tion having its beginning or ending, or both, within the city. In other
words, the ordinance applied solely to through traffic.
The court conceded the city's proprietary interest in its streets, its
police power to regulate traffic and its power of home rule, and con-
ceded further the right of the council to classify the subjects of legislation.
It found, however, that the effect, if not the purpose of this particular
ordinance, was to shield one class or unduly to burden one class unlaw-
fully in its administration. The ordinance was, therefore, violative of
the equal protection of the laws requirements of the state constitution.
The court cited Myers v. City of DefianeY° and distinguished Froelich v.
CleVeland.2 '
Municipal Home Rule - Civil Service
The state constitution grants to all municipal corporations a degree of
"home rule."22 The extent of this power is uncertain at best, being sub-
ject in fact, if not in theory, to inroads from the legislature and to broad or
narrow interpretations by the courts of the qualifications in the Ohio Con-
stitution-that the power is that of "local self government" and that
': City of Bellevue v. Hopps, 164 Ohio St. 523, 132 N.E.2d 204 (1956)
'See Cincinnati v. Luckey, 153 Ohio St. 247, 91 N.E.2d 477, 478 (1950)
" Richter Concrete Corp. v. City of Reading, 136 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio App. 1956)
2067 Ohio App. 159, 36 N.E.2d 162 (1940)
199 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919)
2OHio CoNsT. art. XVIII, §§ 3 and 7
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"local police, sanitary and other similar regulations" must not be "in con-
flict with general laws."23
The Charter of the City of Cleveland provides that the appointment
of a chief of police need not be made from a civil service eligible list.
Section 143.34 of the Revised Code provides that such an office must be
filled from such a list.
There is no question that the respective provisions cannot be recon-
ciled, and in State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland24 the Supreme Court unani-
mously resolved the problem by holding that the method of selecting a
chief of an administrative department is not such a local police regulation
as must conform to general laws. While it had perhaps inferentially
made a similar ruling by overruling a motion to certify the record and
dismissing an appeal as of right in Lapolla v. Daws,25 the inference is
now raised to a more effective position of authority. One may hope that
the court will continue in this course of a reasonable enlargement of the
constitutional authority of municipal corporations, rather than a diminu-
tion of it by narrow construction, as has sometimes unhappily been the
case in the past.26
Home Rule - Qualifications of Councilmen
Similarly, in State ex rel. Bindas v. Andrtsh2 7 the Supreme Court (the
Chief Justice and one other judge dissenting this time) held that the
statutory prohibition28 against a councilman's holding any other public
office or employment29 did not control in the face of a Youngstown char-
ter provision as to the qualifications of councilmen which omitted such
prohibition. Said the court, " by specifying that its councilmen shall
have certain specific qualifications, the people of Youngstown in their
charter have inferentially expressed an intention that those are to be the
only qualifications required of them. "Expresszo uunis est exciuszo
alterius."
' Frecker v. Dayton, 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E.2d 419 (1949), aff'd, 153 Ohio St.
14, 90 NXE.2d 851 (1950); and X-Cel Dairy, Inc. v. Akron, 63 Ohio App. 147, 25
N.E.2d 700 (1939), appeal dismissed, 136 Ohio St. 340, 25 N.E.2d 680 (1940).
2' 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956).
189 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio C.P. 1948), appeal dismissed, 151 Ohio St. 550, 86 N.E.2d
615 (1949); see also Harsney v. Allen, Jr., 160 Ohio St. 36, 113 N.E.2d 86 (1953)
1' See the cases cited in Judge Taft's concurring opinion, 164 Ohio St. 441, 132
N.E.2d 121 (1956)
' 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956).
nOHio REV. CODE § 731.02.
' In this instance the respondent in the quo warranto action was a school teacher in
the public school system of another political subdivision.
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Zoning - Reasonableness of Use Classification
Numerous cases reach the appellate courts from the trial level on the
question of the reasonableness of the classification by the municipal legis-
lative body of particular parcels of land for one or another use. They
are nearly always purely fact questions, and for that reason we have not
dealt with them in past Surveys, since they rarely enunciate any new
legal principles. Since the case of Nectow v. City of Cambridge,30 it has
been well established that as applied to a given parcel of land a zomng
ordinance must not be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. And the
test is usually, in the final analysis, the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.
We note in this Survey the case of Partam v. City of Brooklyn,31 for
the reason that it is an example of absolutely contrary holdings by the
courts within the period of approximately three years as to the same par-
cel of land. What is more, the holdings are probably justifiable, and are
based upon an inexorable march of events, resulting in quickly changing
circumstances.
In the City of Brooklyn there existed a certain 31 acre parcel of real
estate. It was originally zoned for residential purposes. Litigation took
place in 1952 on the question whether, under the facts and circumstances
pertaining then, the dassification was reasonable. The common pleas
court held that it was not, but this was reversed by the court of appeals.32
Motion to certify was overruled and appeal dismissed by the Supreme
Court on October 29, 1952.a1
But in the next three years the population of the city increased con-
siderably and there was a substantial industrial development in the entire
Brooklyn area and surrounding communities, although, of course, not on
this particular parcel. The city council then rezoned the parcel for in-
dustrial purposes. Adjacent property owners and taxpayers sought to en-
join the issuance of an industrial building permit and to have the amend-
ing ordinance declared unconstitutional and void.
The trial court refused petitioners the relief sought and the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court. Citing the same presumption of reason-
ableness which had led them to uphold the zoning when it was for rest-
dential purposes, the court of appeals held that the matter was one "for
-i277 U.S. 183 (1928)
81133 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio App. 1956). The case is also considered in the CoNsTiTu-
TIONAL LAw section, supra.
'Cleveland Trust Co. v. Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440 (1952).
' 158 Ohio St. 258, 108, N.E.2d 679 (1952)
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legislative action rather than for judicial decree."34 It also rebuffed peti-
tioners' contention that "spot zoning" had taken place, and, relying on
Youngstown v. Aiello,35 held that a zoning ordinance is susceptible of
passage as an emergency measure, thereby preventing a referendum
thereon3 6
Liability of Municipalities for Conditions In
Public Highways
The Revised Code has long required municipal corporations to keep
their public highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks and public
grounds open, in repair and free from nuisance.37 This requirement has
been construed to impose liability upon municipalities for injury arising
as a result of failure to comply, so often and in so many different situa-
tions as to require no citation of authority. The extent to which courts
have sometimes gone in declaring comparatively insignificant defects to
constitute "nuisance" has almost made municipalities insurers of the con-
dition of their streets.
Occasionally, however, the municipality gets a break, as in Standard
Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Fremont.3a The application of the statute is limited
generally to conditions affecting the actual physical structure of the
streets or highways and to the physical obstructions or hindrances to
travel thereon.39 In the case at issue the City of Fremont had undertaken
a street widening improvement. Its independent contractor cut off the
roots of a tree in front of plaintiff's property in preparation for removal
of the tree to permit the installation of curbing for the improvement. Be-
fore it could be removed it fell on plaintiffs house.
There could be no liability on the part of the city, inasmuch as the
work had been done by an independent contractor, unless it was to be a
liability under the statute. The Supreme Court properly gave a strict
construction to the statute, limiting its application to conditions in the
street affecting travel thereon, and its benefits to persons injured to those
using the street as a means of travel
SAMUEL SONENFIBLD
'Parnan v. Brooklyn, 133 N.E.2d 616, 619 (Ohio App. 1956).
" 156 Ohio St. 32, 100 N.E.2d 62 (1952).
rOHIo REV. CODE § 731.30.
m OHio REv. CODE § 723.01.
1'164 Ohio St. 344, 131 N.E.2d 221 (1955).
' Typical is Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927).
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